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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
"\IARY LOUISE GERARD,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
PRESTON L. YOUNG and
UNICE YOUNG,

Case No.
10712

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Plaintiff-Respondent
seeking to forfeit a lease for a term of years based on
Defendants-Appellants' alleged "payoffs" on pinball ma:hines and punch boards. Delinquent rental is not an
issue.
This action has been treated as if in unlawful
detainer under 78-36-1, et seq., 1953 UCA, though not
pleaded. The pleading theory of plaintiff is that a lease
provision has been violated by defendants and the lease
should be rescinded, ( R2, Paragraph 6).
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The following hurried sequence of events took
place:
1. Complaint for lease cancellation and for restitu·
tion of the leasehold was filed June 13, 1966 (R. 11.
Time for answer was shortened to three days, arranged
ex parte, with no reference to statutory authority, if any,
to do it (R. 1, 2, 3). 78-36-8, 1953 UCA seems to re·
quire a rental delinquency in order for the court to
shorten time of answer.
2. Ans\ver was filed June 15, denying gambling
or right to restitution of premises if there was gambling
(R. 8).
3. Defendants-Appellants filed motion for summan
judgment on June 15, 1966 (R. 12), noticed for argu·
ment July 5, 1966 ( R. 11).
4. Counsel for plaintiff-respondent obtained special
pretrial setting for 12 p.m., June 22, 1966, though
notice of readiness for trial was not f ilecl by plaintiff
until July 1, 1966 (R. 22).
5. There was no judge for the special pretrial hear·
ing on June 22, 1966, so plaintiff continued it to June
24, 1966. On June 24, the pretrial judge ordered a
further pretrial to be held on September 30, 1966 and
placed the case on the jury trial calendar for Octobe 1
26, 1966.

6. On July 30, 1966, plaintiff-respondent filed m~·
tion for summary judgment, also to be heard on Juh J
1966 (R. 14).
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7. Plaintiff-respondent's motion for summary judgment was supported by three affidavits alleging receipts
of "payoffs" at the leasehold premises, (R. 16, 17, 19).
Defendants-appellants filed an affidavit in opposition to
plaintiff's affidavits stating there was no acquaintance
11ith plaintiff's affiants and that defendants-appellants
\''CfP entitled to examine those persons under oath and
test th<"ir veracity and interest in the subject of the litigation to overcome the self-serving nature and hearsay
ch~1ractcristics in those affidavits submitted by plaintiff,
rR. 23).
8. Both motions for summary judgment were argued
July 5, 1966.
9. Memorandum decision granting plaintiff-respondent's motion for summary judgment was issued by the
Trial Court July 6, 1966 (R. 25).
10. On July 8, 1966 defendants-appellants made
motion for reconsideration of the memorandum decision (R. 29) , which was supported by further affidavit
of rldcndants-appellants stating that the affidavits pertaining to "payoffs" were, to the best knowledge and
belief of affiant, false (R. 26).
11. Based upon the motion to reconsider, with supporting affidavit, the Court ordered both parties' motions
for summary judgment denied and ordered that the
matter remain on the pretrial calendar for Friday, September 30, 1966 and that Trial be held Wednesday,
October 2G, 1966, as previously scheduled. The Court
in tlw order of July 8, affirmatively found that there
1' ei <' 11uestions of fact to be determined at trial ( R. 30).
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12. On July 13, again ex parte, plaintiff's cournrl
obtained a trial setting for July 19, 1966 (R. 34), <le
spite the July 8 order that trial would be October 26,
1966 ( R. 30) .
13. On July 13, 1966, defendants-appellants filed
objection to the July 19 trial setting ( R. 33), noticing
hearing on objection for July 18, 1966 (R. 31 ). Hearin~
on the objection was had before the Honorable Albert
H. Ellett, who refused to proceed with the matter since
the special trial setting had been obtained before the
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson. The court was on vacation on July 19, 1966, with no reporter and no jun
was on hand, despite defendants-appellants demand for
jury having been filed and a jury fee having been paid
(R. 32).
Trial was not held July 19, 1966, though plaintiffs
counsel offered to obtain a court reporter and pay for
him. Plaintiff's counsel was not, however, successful in
persuading the clerk of the court to summons a jury, in
the face of appellant's objection.

14. July 19, 1966, defendants-appellants filed petition to the Supreme Court of Utah for an interlocuton
appeal, which was denied by the court in Case 10692.
July 27, 1966.
15. Under date of July 19, 1966, plaintiff-respondent noticed the taking of defendant's deposition for July
26, 1966. Notice was filed with the Court July 27, 1966
(R. 34).
16. The deposition of defendant, Preston L. Young.
was taken .July 29, 1966 ( R. 60). He refused to ans1 1·er

1
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questions concerning pinballs and punch boards based
011 th<' self-incrimination provisions of the 5th amendment to the United States Constitution.
17. Under date of July 21, 1966 plaintiff-respondent again filed motion for summary judgment based
11pon previous allegations and affidavits set forth in the
first motion for summary judgment heard on July 5,
1966. The motion was filed July 27. ( R. 36).
18. The same matter having already been argued
anrl ruled on by the Trial Court, was again heard and
agrued on August 9, 1966.
19. On August 9, 1966, the day of the second argument, the Trial Court made and entered its order granting plaintiff-respondent's latest motion for summary
judgment, from which order this appeal is taken.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
1. Defendants-appellants seek decision that having
pinballs and punch boards on cafe premises, even if
"payoffs" are made, is not sufficient grounds to found
an action in unlawful detainer.
2. Appellants seek ruling that if there were "payoffs" on pinball machines and punch boards then the
Utah gambling statutes are unconstitutional and such
conduct is not unlawful.
3. In the alternative, appellants seek ruling that the
issue of gambling be decided by a jury; and that gambling, if any, as an "unlawful business" under 78-36-3 ( 4),
1953 UCA, or as a "material breach" of lease be determined hy a jury these questions being issues of fact,
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not properly ruled on as a matter of law by the Trial
Court.
STATEMENTOF FACTS
In 1964, plaintiff and defendant extended a prior
lease made in 1962, and entered into a new three year
lease commencing April 15, 1965 for a cafe and caft
equipment at 890 West 2100 South Street, Salt Lake
County. There was prepayment by appellants of $1,500
under the new lease, as rental for the last 5 months of
the new term, which expires May 14, 1968.
Monthly rentals payments of $300 were always paid
when due, or in advance.
Without consent or knowledge of appellants, plaintiff executed lease agreement on August 13, 1965, \1it!t
American Oil Company, covering certain other propert1,
but including the property already under lease to ap
pellants. Under the American Oil Company lease, plaintiff received the sum of $4,500 as advance rental for th
first 6 months, together with the sum of $1,500, in return
for which plaintiff was to obtain cancellation of clefenclants-appellants' lease ( R. 4 7).
1

The "cancellation" attempt resulting from this agreement with American Oil Company was the hiring of
persons who executed affidavits in support of plaintiff,
first motion for summary judgment based on gambling
( R. 16, 17, 19) . The $1,500 lease prepayment made bi
appellants was tendered into court by plaintiff upo11
filing the complaint. It is the same amount gotten frorn
American Oil Company in consideration for getting de

1
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fcndants off the property later leased to American Oil
Company, despite appellants' prior lease.
The $1,500 received by plaintiff from American
Oil Company and tendered into court by plaintiff was,
of course, promptly sequestered and taken back on the
same clay of the last argument for summary judgment,
pursuant to the order signed that day ( R. 55).
The clay after the order was signed, appellants received phone notice of the entry of judgment, but not
of the order for release of money. Appellants were not
served a copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment until about a week later. It will be
noted that the certificate of mailing on the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law is blank, and is erroneous,
R-54, giving good further reflection of the cavalier attitude ;i_nd abuse of process by plaintiff throughout this
entire proceeding.
Point I
ARGUMENT
"PAYOFFS" ON PUNCH BOARDS AND PINBALL
MACHINES IN A CAFE IS NOT SUFFICIENT
GROUNDS TO FOUND AN ACTION IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER OR TO CAUSE FORFEITURE
OF A LEASE.
Lt isn't disputed that plaintiff's sole claim to lease

forfeiture and restitution of premises is founded on al-

IFgerl "payoffs'' by defendants on puch boards and pinhall machines, as is apparent from plaintiff's complaint,
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R. 1; plaintiff's notice of April 11, 1966, R. 4; and the
notice of June 3, 1966, R. 6.
Defendants contend that even if there were "pay.
offs," which to this point is not proved it being an issue
of fact, then the harsh remedy of unlawful detainer and
forfeiture should not be made available to plaintiff to
cancel this lease, but rather plaintiff's remedy would
be an action for damages or for injunctive relief.
This particular point was raised in a lessor's attempt to forfeit a lease because horse-race bets were
taken by the lessee of a cafe. The California District
Court of Appeals decided in Keating vs. Preston, 108
Pac. 2nd 479, that forfeiture would not be permitted even
though there was an illegal use by gambling. The California court held that lessor's proper action was in damages or for an injunction, not forfeiture which is histori·
cally frowned upon by the courts.
Appellants also urge the court to consider that
having pinball machines and punch boards on these cafc
premises is not the reason for this action, but rather
it is that plaintiff has been able to obtain a bettrr agree·
men with a different lessee for much more money. De·
fendants have been in the cafc business for 25 years
without any trouble of any kind, and in possession of this
cafe since 1962 - and isn't it odd that all of this sud·
denly results when American Oil Company enters the
scene?
For the conspiratorial note involved in this hurried
and abusive action, appellants again emphasize that
American Oil Company paid $1,500 to plaintiff to ob·
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ta in cancellation of defendant's lease right ( R. 4 7).
The great hurry is that the Oil Company wants to tear
the building down and get on with its own construction
on appellant's property, ( R. 49).

As before stated, though this action is treated as
bring in unlawful detainer, plaintiff's complaint theory
is breach of agreement.
Paragraph 6 of plaintiff's complaint, R. 2, reads:
"It is understood and agreed that the leased
premises shall be occupied and used as a restaurant and cafe only and for no other purpose whatcwr, and the Youngs agree to conduct said busiJH'SS strictly in compliance with law."

That allegation quotes a provision of the lease, and
ckfendants claim violation thereof by maintaining a
"gambling house."

As pertains to this particular facet of plaintiff's
claim, appellants call the court's attention to the need
to establish materially of breach in order to found rec1ss10n.
There is fair summary of the law to be applied
to the facts here at 12 Am ]ur Contracts, Sec. 440, where
it is stated:

"It is not every breach of a contract or failure
exactly to perform - certainly not every partial
failure to perform - that entitles the other party
to rt'scind.
"A breach which goes only to a part of the
considnation, is incidental and subordinate to the
main purpose of the contract, and may be comp<'nsatt·d in damages does not warrant a recission
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of the contract; the injured party is still bound to
perform his part of the agreement, his only remedv
for the breach consists of the damages he h~1
suffered therefrom. A recission is not warranted
by a breach of contract not so substantial and
fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties
in making the agreement. Before partial failure
of consideration of one party will give the other
the right of recission, the act failed to be performed
must go to the root of the contract where tht> failure to perform the contract must be in respect of
matters which would render the performance of
the remainder a thing different in substance from
that which was contracted for." (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, what is the state of evidence as
to the materiality of breach by defendants, if indeed
there was a breach? :
1. There are allegations of gambling m the complaint (R. 1).
2. The allegations arc denied in the answer, claiming if gambling is proved, such is not a material breach
(R. 8).
3. There are 3 affidavits by plaintiff's hirelings,
alleging "payoffs" ( R. 16, 17, 19).
4. There are 2 affidavits by defendants denying
same (R. 23, 26).
5. There is defendant's refusal to answer questions
concerning "payoffs" in his deposition, ( R. 60, pages 3,
4, 5, 6), based on the 5th amendment to the United
States Consitution.
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Since the affidavits and the pleadings now stand in
equipoise, there is a reserved question of fact for determination by the jury.
Also, where is evidence of materiality which can be
a question of fact? There is none, except what may be
determined by a jury under proper instructions, if gambling is found to be the fact by the jury. Further, the
state of evidence, if the matter is tried as it should be,
could well warrant a finding as a matter of law, that
such gambling as may be proved, if at all, is not a substantial breach that would relieve the landlord from
continuing to perform her part of the agreement. Her
remedy would be for damages, if she could prove them.
The proper remedy for all concerned as appellant
sees it, would be to let the plaintiff and American Oil
Company resolve their own differences and teach those
people that prior written obligations are not to be so
lightly treated.
Further, Sec. 78-36-3 ( 4), 1953 UCA, states that to
found an action in unlawful detainer there must be
conducted "unlawful business." Appellants contend that
plaintiff must prove a "business" of gambling, not merely
an incident of the operation of a cafe business. Both
concepts, statutory "business" and "breach of a lease
condition" relate to materiality, which is a question of
fact.
The evidence, if this matter is remanded for orderly
Judicial Proceedings and trial by jury, as is appellants'
constitutional right, will show there was no statutory
''unlawful business."
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Business is defined as "one's regular work occupation or employment," Webster's Collegiate Dictionary,
St h Edition page 137. Appellants' business is running a
cafe. If there were payoffs, which respondent must prove,
then she must also prove that was the "business" of
appellants, and not just incidental to the business of
running a cafe. She must prove that the tail wags the dog.
Point II.
UTAH STATUTES MAKING "PAY OFFS" ON
PINBALL MACHINES AND PUNCH BOARDS
FELONIOUS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE OF INVALID CLASSIFICATION, IMPROPER DELEGATION AND AMBIGUITY.
Gambling offenses in the State of Utah are set forth
in title 76, chapter 27, Secs. 1 et seq. 1953 Code Anno·
tated. In the entire chapter, there is only one section
which reasonably describes the offense of gambling by
pinball machines and by punch boards, that is Sec. I
which makes it a felony, supra, D' Orio vs. Startup
Candy Co., 71 U 410, 26 Pac. 1037.
Appellants contend that because of that, the entire·
ty of Title 76, chapter 27 in unconstitutional, as it is
invalid classification which is prohibited by the provisions
of Article 1, Section 2 and 24 of the Utah State Con·
stitution and the 14th amendment to the United States
Constitution. This is so for the reason that operation of
pinball machines and punch boards for gaming is made
a felony, but the operation of a slot machine, for gaming
or exhibition of bawdy pictures constitutes only a mis·
demeanor, 76-27-8; lottery is punishable as a misdemean·
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or, 76-27-9; 76-27-10. The sale of vending tickets or
other chances is a misdemeanor, 76-27-11, as are the
1cmaining purportedly proscribed games in the rest of
the sections of title 76, chapter 27, which include other
tJ"pes of lottery and bingo; bookmaking; pool selling;
option selling, and all kinds of contests of chance and
skill involving speed and powers of endurance of man
and animal.
Appellants urge it to be fundamental that for the
State to make it a felony to play with punch boards and
pinball machines but only a misdemeanor to run a slot
machine, horsebook, all types of pool bets and drawings,
boxing contests, ad infinitum, is obviously so discriminatory that the entire chapter should be stricken, there
being no savings clause.
Appellants acknowledge that an act shall not be
deemed unconstiutional because of discrimination so long
as there is reasonable basis for differentiation between
classes and there is proper relation to the purpose to be
accomplished by reason of difference.
It would be an onerous burden for this court to
attempt to uphold apparent legislative expression that
it is far worse, from a public policy standpoint, to pay
on a pinball machine or a punch board than it is to
operate a "one-armed bandit," which crime is only declared to be a misdemeanor, or to play bingo, or take
brts on the fights or the ponies, all misdemeanors.
If it be urged that the operation of pinball machines
and punch boards can be fitted into one of the misdernr;mor sections of title 76, chapter 27, then there is
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sufficient ambiguity to render the entire chapter unconstitutional.
Further, if pinballs and punch boards can be made
to fit any of the misdemeanor sections, then the entire
chapter is also unconstitutional because of unauthorized
delegation by the legislature of authority to police officers
and prosecuting attorneys to determine, willy-nilly, whether a person committing one act should be charged as a
felon or a misdemeanant. The case of United States vs.
Louisville Nashville Railroad Company, 176 Federal 942,
stands for the proposition that a crime can be created
only by a public act. The language of the act must be
sufficient to completely declare and define the crime
and affix the punishment. The court in that case stated
that it is not competent for congress to delegate to the
president or to the head of an executive department the
power to declare what facts may constitute an offense. ,
Appellants also contend there shouldn't be authority to
determine degree, either - on the same set of facts.
Southwest Engineering Company vs. Ernst (Ariz),
291 Pac. 764 states that indefiniteness of a statutory reg·
ulation may be treated as an invalid delegation of power.
The case holds that statutory language imposing duties
must be so sufficient and definite as to serve as a guide
to those who have the duty imposed upon them. If there
is not sufficient literal significance of language to be
capable of intelligent interpretation, such act would
violate the Constitutional mandate, directing that the
powers of the three branches of government be separate.
A legislative body cannot confer unlimited power upo~
an officer without designating standards to guide his

1
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action, supra In Re Petersen, 331 Pac. 2nd 24 (Calif.).
It is respectfully submitted that the gambling statutes of Utah are unconstitutional based on invalid classificaion and ambiguity. They are also unconstitutional
because of unauthorized delegation of power if it is found
that paying off on pinball machines and punch boards
can be either a misdemeanor or a felony under Utah
Code.
It is evident that if there is no crime because of
these Constitutional objections, then plaintiff-respondent
has no standing to charge unlawful activity of any
kind or nature.
Point III.

GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE
THERE IS CONTROVERTED MATERIAL FACT
IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of Respondent under Rule 56 ( c) URCP, which is
authorized:
"If the pleadings, depositions and admissions
on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Respondent's motion for summary judgment was
supported by self-serving affidavits of plaintiff's son
and other paid hirelings. ( R. 16, 17, 18, 19) . Each relevant statement of plaintiff's affidavits has been specifically denied by opposing affidavits executed by defendant-appellant. (R. 23, 26).
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This court in Christensen vs. Financial Serv 1u
Company, 14 U 2nd 101, 377 Pac 2nd 1010, held that
conditions for summary judgment are obviously not met
if the allegations of the pleadings stand in opposition to
the averments of affidavits so that there are controverted
issues of fact, the determination of which is necessan
to settle the rights of the parties. That case distinguished
Dupler vs. Yates, JO U 2nd 251, 351 Pac. 2nd 624, as
well as Continental Bank and Trust Company vs. Cunningham, JO Utah 2nd 329, 351 Pac 2nd 168, in which
cases it was found that the affidavits, exhibits and documentary evidence did in fact resolve all material facts
and in which cases the germane affidavits were not
denied or controverted by opposing affidavits.

In the case at bar, there is total absence of any
documentary or other type independent evidence to enable the court to find that the facts as claimed by plaintiff-respondent are irrefutably established. In this case,
the allegations in the pleadings stand in opposition to
what is stated in the self-serving affidavits of plaintiff.
In addition, the opposing affidavits of defendant ex·
pressly controverts every material statement contained
in plaintiff-respondent's affidavits.
As has been stated, the only additional matter con·
sidered by the Trial Court in the second argument of
plaintiff-respondent's motion for summary judgment was
the deposition of defendant when he refused to answer
questions concerning "payoffs" on the grounds of self
incrimination under the 5th amendment to the United
States Constitution ( R. 60, pages 3, 4, 5 and 6).
Appellants concede that refusal to testify may prop·

1
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crly be considered by the trier of fact, under proper
instruction from the court.
Plaintiff's attorney also agrees with the concept of
Jaw as appellant urges it. In the deposition of Preston
L. Young taken July 29, 1966, the following took place
after defendant's counsel advised defendant to refuse to
answer questions concerning gambling ( R. 60, pages
5-6) :

"Question by Mr. King: Has your attorney
advised you that refusal to answer in a civil action
because your answer might intend to incriminate
you, might induce the court to assume that your
answer might be unfavorable?"
"Answer: I refuse to answer based on the
)th amendment."
"Question: The refusal to answer doesn't lie

on that because there is no fact involved there."

"Mr. Bridwell: For your information Mr.
King, that happens to be wrong. Yes, we have
discussed that with him."
"A1r. King: You have discussed with him
that his refusal to answer this type of question
will probably result in the court finding the fact
that he has?"
"Mr. Bridwell: I think that is a question for
the trier of facts. Since you are counsel and not

judge, that would be up to the judge or trier of
facts. In this case it would be a jury. There is a
rcbuttable presumption, or more accurately stated:
it would entitle you to an instruction to the jury
that thev mav find that way because of the refusal.'' ·
·
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"J,fr. King: I will accept that as being an
accurate statement."

Appellants feel that the right to reversal is so elemental that they will not belabor this. However, in point
is the language contained at 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec.
190:
"The law creates a presumption, where the

bu~den is _on. a p_arty to prove a material fact pe-

culiarly w1thm his knowledge and he fails without
excuse to testify, that his testimony, if introduced,
would be adverse to his interest."
But, as stated at page 194 of 20 Am. Jur.:

"In any event, where the presumption does
ordinarily apply, it will be viewed as partaking
of none of the character of affirmative proof. The
presumptive effect of the failure of a witness to
testify is obviously not tantamount to proof of the
fact sought to be established through such witness.
(Emphasis supplied).
As has been set forth by this Court in Bullock vs.
Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc 11 Utah 2nd 1, 354
Pac. 2nd 599, there must be a showing to authorize sum·
mary judgment that is supported by evidence, admissions
and inferences which, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the loser, reveals there is no genuine issue
concerning any material fact. That showing must pre·
elude all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if
given a trial, produce evidence which could reasonably
sustain a judgment in his favor. Obviously, credibilit)
of plaintiff-respondent's witnesses is for the jury to d~
termine, after having received the benefit of cross exam 1·
nation by defendant's lawyers.
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There is no ground upon which the trial court could
possibly be sustained in granting plaintiff-respondent's
motion. Such ruling is inconsistent with fair play and
the concept that a citizen is entitled to his day in court.

CONLCUSION
It is clear appellant is entitled to a trial by jury with an added admonition by the court that trial prow:·dings should move with expedition, but not by use of
abusive process. This is a good case to set forth cautionary
words for the benefit of future zealots, pushing untenable
position for unworthy motive.
It is urged that the court announce that even if
plaintiff were to prevail in a trial by jury that defendants were gaming, which has not been proved at this
point, that such cannot serve to revoke a lease because
ltgislative intent concerning gaming as set forth in Chapter 27, Title 76, 1953 UCA is not capable of intelligent
interpretation or application - or if it is definite, it is
so far from reality and the sound constitutional concepts
of reasonable classification as to be void.

Respectfully submitted,

BRIDWELL & RIMENSBERGER
By GEORGE E. BRIDWELL
Received two true copies hereof this 28th day of
October, 1966.

K. SAMUEL KING

Attorney for Respondent

